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Health and Welfare
Health and Welfare; Proposition 96-AIDS public safety and
testing
Health and Safety Code §§ 199.95, 199.96, 199.97, 199.98, 199.99
(new).
1988 CAL. STAT. Prop. 96.
(Effective November 9, 1988)*
1
Proposition 96 creates two exceptions to the existing requirement
that the state obtain a person's written consent before testing the
person for the presence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) antibodies. 2 These exceptions establish the framework for
providing precautionary information to peace officers, firefighters,
emergency medical personnel, and custodial personnel, as well as to
victims and defendants of certain sex crimes who might have been4
3
exposed to the AIDS virus. Under Proposition 96, an eligible party
* Proposition 96 applies retrospectively to all pending complaints and petitions irrespective of when the underlying actions took place, with maximum application to the information subject to disclosure obtained prior to the effective date of this proposition. 1988 Cal.
Stat. prop. 96, sec. 2, at _.
1. CAL. HEALT & SAxry CODE § 199.22(a) (requires a person's written consent before
testing them for AIDS). See id. § 199.27 (consent requirements for AIDS tests when the
subject is incompetent).
2. Id. §§ 199.96 (defendants accused of certain sexual crimes may be subjected to
nonconsensua testing), 199.97 (persons who interfere with peace officers, firefighters, or
emergency medical personnel may be subjected to nonconsensual testing). See id. § 199.97
(definition of interference).
3. Id. § 199.95. Proposition 96 furnishes the information so that adequate precautions
can be taken or groundless fears may be relieved in response to the threat to public safety
posed by AIDS and AIDS-related conditions. Id. See id. § 199.46 (definition of AIDS).
4. Id. §§ 199.96 (allows alleged victims or the prosecuting attorney of certain sexual
crimes to petition), 199.97 (allows peace officers, firefighters, emergency medical personnel,
or their employing agency to petition). A victim listed in the criminal complaint or juvenile
petition must file a written request for a court to order a blood test of any criminal defendant
or minor charged with any violation of Penal Code sections 261 (rape), 261.5 (unlawful sexual
intercourse with a female under age 18), 262 (spousal rape), 266b (abduction to live in an
illicit relation), 266c (inducement by fear to engage in sexual intercourse, to penetration by a
foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, to oral copulation, or to sodomy), 286
(unlawful sodomy), 288 (lewd or lascivious acts with a child under age 14), or 288a (unlawful
oral copulation). Id. § 199.96.
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may petition the court to order a criminal defendant or minor to
submit to a nonconsensual AIDS test.- The petition must allege that
a person charged in a criminal complaint or juvenile petition either
interfered 6 with the petitioner's official duties, or is charged with an
enumerated sexual crime. 7 The court must order the test if, after
conducting a hearing, it finds probable cause that a bodily fluid was
transferred. 8
Upon approving the petition, the court must order the defendant's
blood specimens to be sent to a licensed medical laboratory for
testing. 9 The laboratory must use medically accepted tests for indications of exposure or infection by AIDS or AIDS-related conditions. 10 Copies of the test results must be sent with a disclaimer" to
the following: (1) The defendant or minor; (2) each victim who
requests the results; and (3) the chief medical officer and officer in
charge of the facility if the tested person is incarcerated or detained. 2

5. Id. §§ 199.96, 199.97 (the court must promptly conduct a hearing upon receipt of the
petition).
6. Interference by biting, scratching, spitting, or transferring blood, saliva, or other body
fluids on or through their skin or membranes. Id. § 199.97.
7. Id.
8. Id. §§ 199.96, 199.97. Proposition 96 mandates a showing of probable cause that the
possibility of a transfer of blood, semen, saliva, or other bodily fluid took place between the
defendant and the person requesting the test. Id. Since the court issues an order to compel
testing, refusing to take the test is apparently only punishable by contempt. See In re McKinney,
70 Cal. 2d 8, 10-11, 447 P.2d 972, 974, 73 Cal. Rptr. 580, 582 (1968) (courts have the inherent
power to punish for contempt). See also Kreling v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 884, 887, 118
P.2d 470, 472 (1941) (habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to halt the enforcement of an
invalid judgment of contempt); McLaughlin v. Superior Court 128 Cal. App. 2d 62, 65, 274
P.2d 745, 747 (1954) (a person cannot be in contempt unless there is a valid enforceable order
at the time the alleged acts of contempt were committed). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §
166(4) (willful disobedience of a lawfully issued court order is a misdemeanor); CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. §§ 1209(a)(5) (disobedience of an order of the court is contempt), 1211 (summary
punishment for contempt), 1218 (determination of guilt by the court and punishment of fines
or imprisonment), 1219 (imprisonment to compel performance).
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.98(b).
tO. Id. (also requiring tests for communicable diseases when the court determines that the
tests are economically and readily available). Blood samples are to be taken by only a licensed
vocational nurse, medical technician, phlebotomist, physician, or registered nurse. Id. §
199.98(a). Proposition 96 does not specifically require confirmatory tests. See id. § 199.98.
Proposition 96 does require two samples to be taken. Id. §§ 199.96, 199.97.
11. The disclaimer must state: "The tests were conducted in a medically approved manner
but tests cannot determine exposure to or infection by AIDS or other communicable disea,.es
with absolute accuracy. Persons receiving this test result should continue to monitor their own
health and should consult a physician as appropriate." Id. § 199.98(d).
12. Id. §§ 199.96, 199.97. The court must order all persons receiving results pursuant to
these sections to maintain the confidentiality of the personal identifying data except when
disclosure is necessary for medical or psychological care. Id. § 199.98(e). Copies of the test
results must be sent to the parents or guardian of the tested minor. Id. § 199.98(d). If the
test results indicate exposure or infection by AIDS, AIDS-related conditions, or communicable
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13
Medical personnel who provide service to detention facilities and
receive information 14 that an inmate or minor has had AIDS or
communicable disease exposure or infection must report the infor-

5
mation to the officer in charge of the detention facility.'
COMMENT

Proposition 96 permits the state to obtain and release data on
individuals without their consent. Proposition 96 may, therefore, be
susceptible to challenge based upon either the California right to
privacy or the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Such challenges will require the courts to balance the constitutional
rights of the individuals against the state interest in obtaining and
releasing the information.
6
The California constitution, unlike the federal constitution, pro7
vides an express right to privacy.' Proposition 96 contravenes this

Services. Id. §
diseases, copies of the results must be sent to the State Department of Health
pursuant to these
199.98(c). Persons who test, transmit test results, or disclose information
conflict with existing
provisions are immune from civil liability. Id. § 199.98(g). In case of a
and consent
confidentiality
the
supersede
to
intended
is
96
Proposition
case law or statutes,
can be compelled
criteria, including those in Health and Safety Code sections 199.20 (no person
identifying
to identify any person who is the subject of an AIDS test), 199.30 (personally
requireAIDS research records are not to be disclosed), 199.42 (penalties and confidentiality by the
acquired
or
developed
records
health
AIDS-related
identifying
ments for personally
689 F. Supp. 874
state or public health agency). Id. § 199.95. But see Woods v. White,
right to privacy
(W.D.Wis. 1988) (a prisoner with AIDS has a 14th amendment constitutional
records).
medical
his
of
disclosure
the
in
services
13. Medical personnel receiving payments or under contract to provide medical
to state prisons,
to any state, municipal, or county government or agency providing service
hospital jail ward,
the Medical Facility, any Youth Authority institution, county jail, city jail,
minors or adults.
detains
that
facility
other
any
or
facility,
detention
juvenile
hall,
juvenile
199.99(a).
§
CODE
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
with written
14. Except when communicated or obtained by a scientific research study
includes: (1) A
approval expressly waiving disclosure by the officer in charge, information
or communilaboratory test indicating exposure to the AIDS virus, AIDS-related conditions,
personnel
medical
the
to
inmate
or
minor
the
by
made
cable disease; (2) any statements
or test indicating
indicating exposure or infection; or (3) the results of any medical examination
the personnel that
infection or exposure. Id. § 199.99(b). The officer in charge must notify
fluids, of the
bodily
their
with
contact
or
minor,
or
inmate
the
with
contact
had
may have
the inmate
of
caring
the
for
taken
be
can
measures
protective
so
contents of the information
officer in charge
or minor and the safety of other inmates and personnel. Id. § 199.99(c). The
confidential except
and all other personnel receiving information must keep the identifying data
199.99(d). Willful
§
Id.
help.
psychological
or
medical
obtain
to
necessary
is
when disclosure
patient, except
the
of
consent
written
the
without
person
any
to
disclosure of identifying data
or when authorized, is a
to a peace officer or federal, state, or local health agency employee
misdemeanor. Id. § 199.99(e).
15. Id. § 199.99(a).
rights to personal
16. The Supreme Court has recognized protection of certain fundamental
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right.' 8 The state may, however, justify an impairment of the right

to privacy upon the showing of a compelling state interest.' 9 Fur-

thermore, the state must show that the impairment is necessary to

achieve the compelling state interest. 20 The Proposition's future will

therefore depend on whether the courts find that the state has a
compelling interest in obtaining the information and whether impairment of the individual's right to privacy is necessary to further
that interest.
privacy under the fourteenth amendment concept of personal liberty relating to activities
in
cases such as: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973) (a woman's right to choose whether
to carry her pregnancy to term); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454 (1972) (right
to
use contraception for an unmarried person); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568
(1969)
(personal intimacies of the home); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (interracial
marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-486 (1965) (right to use contraception);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925)
(child rearing and education). See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1976) (recognizing
two
kinds of privacy interests, the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal information,
and the interest of freedom of choice for certain kinds of fundamental matters, in evaluating
the safeguarding of privacy interests in the assimilation of private medical information
in a
state computer bank about prescription controlled substance users). See also J.P. v. DeSanti,
653 F.2d 1080, 1089-1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (in an action by juveniles to prevent the collection
and dissemination of their social histories by probation authorities, the court refused
to
recognize anything more than a general constitutional right to have the disclosure of private
information measured against the need for disclosure). See generally Glover v. Eastern Nebraska
Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243 (D.Neb. 1988) (mandatory AIDS
testing
of employees without an overriding public policy concern is unconstitutional); Doe
v. Roe,
139 Misc. 2d 209, -,
526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (1988) (a compelling state need must be shown
for a mandatory AIDS test when mental health is endangered).
17. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, sec. 1 (among the inalienable rights of all people is the right
of
"pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy").
18. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774-775, 533 P.2d 222, 233-234, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94, 105-106 (1975) (the primary purpose of the right to privacy clause is to protect individuals
from the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom by society's increased surveillance
and data collection).
19. See Division of Medical Quality v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 679-681,
156
Cal. Rptr. 55, 61-63 (1979) (patient-physician records sought by the medical board fell
under
the privacy protection of the California constitution and a compelling state interest must
be
shown to justify the incursion into the medical information of the individual, as
well as
adequate safeguards for the individual's constitutional privacy rights). See also City of
Santa
Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130, 610 P.2d 436, 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542
(1980)
(applying the compelling state interest test to a residential zoning ordinance restricting
the
number of unrelated people living together). In deciding whether to permit an intrusion,
the
courts must balance the state interest in discovering the information against an individual's
right to privacy. Id.
20. Wood v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 1147, 212 Cal. Rptr. 811,
820
(1985). Balancing the power of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance to subpoena records
of all of physicians' patients without their consent with the privacy interests of those
patients
and limiting the power to only relevant and material records to the investigation.
Id. An
alternative means of securing the compelling state interest to minimize or avoid the competing
interests of the state and the individual's constitutional protection must be implemented
if
possible. Id. The state must use the least intrusive means to achieve the satisfaction
of the
compelling interest. Id.
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The Proposition states that its purpose is to enact a precautionary
measure with respect to specific threats to public safety posed by
AIDS. 21 In an effort to counter one of these threats, Proposition 96
purports to allow peace officers, health care workers, firefighters,
and custodial personnel to perform their duties without the fear of
being unable to determine whether they have been exposed to the

AIDS virus. 22 Such information is also intended to relieve victims of
'
sexual crimes from a "groundless fear of infection. "23 The state
almost certainly will assert that, given the deadly nature of AIDS, it
has a compelling interest in discovering this type of information.
Although the state interest may be compelling, Proposition 96's
nonconsensual testing provisions must be necessary to further that
interest. This warrants an examination of the test procedures. Proposition 96 provides that the blood will be extracted by medical
personnel and tested in a medically approved manner, indicating a
somewhat routine diagnostic procedure for determining exposure to
disease in present day society. The proposition, however, fails to
designate who decides what test is to be used, which test is to be
used, how accurate the test must be, or who is to make the disclosures24
to the various parties after the test is made on an accused or minor.

21. CAL. HE TH & SAFETY CODE § 199.95.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 199.98(b). Proposition 96 merely requires the blood to be tested by a licensed
medical laboratory for medically accepted indications of AIDS exposure and infection, plus
any other communicable diseases readily and economically available as determined by the court
and does not require confirmatory tests or designate who pays for the testing. Id. § 199.98(a)(g). The 1988 legislature enacted various AIDS testing statutes. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1088,
(enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26, and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1)
see. 1, at (allowing the testing of a criminal defendant upon a showing of probable cause that a fluid
capable of transmitting the AIDS virus was transferred, requiring counseling about the testing
procedures and results, providing for confirmatory tests, and delegating the establishment of
testing procedures to the local health officer based on federal standards); id. 1119 sec. 2, at.
(enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.221, and CAL. WELFARE & INsTrruTioNs CODE
§ 1768.9) (allowing testing of inmates or wards of the California Youth Authority for AIDS
if the person evidences symptoms of AIDS or AIDS-related complex by state licensed AIDS
testing laboratories, requiring pretest counseling, and providing for confirmatory testing); id.
(enacting CAL. INS. CODE §§ 799, 799.01, 799.02, 799.03, 799.04, 799.05,
1279 sec. 1, at 799.06, 799.07, 799.08, 799.09) (setting AIDS testing standards for insurance companies to
avoid unfair distinctions between individuals when underwriting life and disability insurance
and requiring a positive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay serologic test (ELISA), followed
by a reactive Western Blot Assay test on the same specimen of blood before denying the
- (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
insurance application); id. 1579 sec. 2, chs. 1-6, at
CODE § 199.222, and CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 7500, 7501, 7502, 7503, 7504, 7510, 7511, 7512,
7512.5, 7513, 7514, 7515, 7516, 7516.5, 7516.8, 7517, 7518, 7519, 7520, 7521, 7522, 7523,
7530, 7531, 7540, 7550, 7551, 7552, 7553) (allowing law enforcement employees to request
testing of inmates, detainees, probationers, or parolees for AIDS upon some reasonable
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The more accurate tests for the direct causative agent of AIDS are
generally not practicable for routine use. 25 These factors increase the
potential for a false positive test result to be disclosed. 26 Such a
disclosure may be mentally devastating for both the accused and the
victim despite any accompanying disclaimer. Because of this lack of
safeguards to prevent inaccurate or unnecessary disclosures, Proposition 96's test procedures may not sufficiently further the state
interest, and, therefore, may fail to justify an impairment of the
individual's right to privacyYz '
In addition to the potential challenges under the California constitution's right to privacy, Proposition 96 may violate the fourth

suspicion of the presence of the virus, requiring counseling about precautionary measures and
providing for confirmatory tests); id. 1597 secs. 2-5, at (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§
647(0, 1202.1, 1202.6, 12022.85) (requiring AIDS testing upon conviction of certain sex offenses
or upon conviction of prostitution, providing a sentence enhancement for knowingly committing
certain sex crimes when infected with AIDS, requiring counseling programs to be implemented,
and delegating the establishment of testing procedures to the county probation officer in
consultation with the local health officer). See generally Review of Selected 1988 California
Legislation, 20 PAc. L.J. 536, 560, 653, 661, 682 (1989) (providing an analysis of chapters
10E8, 1119, 1279, 1579, 1597).
25. Banks & McFadden, Rush to Judgment: HIV Test Reliability and Screening, 23 TULSA
L.J. 1, 5 (1987). There are two types of tests to screen for infectious diseases: (1) a direct test
for the etiological (causative) agent, which are generally commercially unavailable, too expensive, or too complex to be practicable for routine use; and (2) an indirect test, such as those
in use today, which infers the presence of disease and is consequently less accurate. Id.
26. See Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, -,
526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (1988) (there is an
incubation period from six weeks to six months or more before the antibody reaction shows).
The tests are not diagnostic but rather, are intended to protect the blood supply; therefore,
accuracy rates of commercial laboratories vary widely and some have up to 200,'0 false-positive
rates on pretested samples. Id. 139 Misc. 2d at
-,
526 N.Y.S.2d at 721; Clifford and
luculano, Aids and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARv. L. REV.
1806, 1812 (1987) (a series of tests called the ELISA-ELISA-Western blot has been found to
have 99.9% accuracy). See generally Banks and McFadden, supra note 25 (discussing the
reliability of present testing methods and the high false-positive rate to protect the blood
supply); Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 739, 746-747 (1986) (AIDS blood tests only indicate that the person carries the
antibodies to the AIDS virus, the tests do not directly reveal the presence of the AIDS virus,
and therefore, the presence of HIV antibodies should only be considered presumptive evidence
of current infection or infectiousness); Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1274 (1986) (analysis of federal first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment
constraints on legislation enacted that affects AIDS carriers and high risk groups in response
to the fear of AIDS); Law, Social Policy, and Contagious Disease: A Symposium on Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 14 HoFsRA' L. REv. 1 (1985) (giving a broad overview
of medical, employment, public health, criminal, legislative, constitutional, and world issues
concerning AIDS).
27. Division of Medical Quality v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 679-681, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 55, 61-63 (1979) (requiring a compelling state interest and adequate safeguards for the
individual's privacy rights). See generally Rasmussen v. South Fla. Serv., Inc., 500 So.2d 533
(Florida 1987) (the right to privacy under the Florida state constitution would not permit
discovery of the names and addregses of 51 blood donors after an auto accident victim donee
cortracted AIDS because of the potential significant harm to unsuspecting donors, and the
low probative value of the discovery, outweighed the donee's need for the information).
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amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 28 This

constitutional safeguard, however, does not forbid states from making minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently
limited conditions. 29 Under existing law, a court must find probable
cause30 to believe an intrusion will reveal material evidence of a crime
before it may order an intrusion.3 Moreover, a court must balance

28. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (". . .the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
29. See e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). The decision to invade
a person's body in search of evidence of guilt must be informed, detached, and deliberate.
Id. at 770. See also Plowman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627 (E.D.
Va. 1988) (nonconsensual AIDS tests on civilian employee's blood already extracted for
extensive diagnostic tests upon admission to an army hospital was justified by the medical
necessity of informing medical personnel of the patient's HIV status outweighing the individual's
privacy interests); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State,
662 F. Supp. 50, 52-53 (D.D.C. 1987) (the court refused to enjoin HIV testing as part of an
established series of extensive diagnostic blood tests for Foreign Service employees finding a
rational relationship between the legitimate purpose of finding out the individual's fitness for
duty and the addition of the test). Compare National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (mandatory urine testing, not based on individualized suspicion
as a requirement for promotion into certain customs agent positions, is not an unreasonable
search), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988) with Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley,
839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988) (post-accident testing of railway workers absent a particularized
suspicion that the test will reveal evidence of current drug or alcohol impairment is an
unreasonable search), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988). See generally Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J., Local 318 v. Township of Wash., 850 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir. 1988) (mandatory
random drug testing programs were administrative search exceptions to the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment and because of the pervasive regulation of the police department,
police officers had a reduced expectation of privacy); Amalgamated Transit Union, Division
1279 v. Cambria County Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (the uniform
nondiscriminatory application of mandatory drug and alcohol testing during annual physicals
of bus drivers and mechanics not based on reasonable suspicion, when blood and urine samples
were already required, satisfied the fourth amendment's privacy and arbitrary governmental
intrusion requirements); Poole v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. 149 (D.N.J. 1988) (random drug
testing of prison guard recruits did not violate the fourth amendment due to the reduced
expectation of privacy because of the recruits knowledge of the demands of the occupation);
Amalgamated Transit Union 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (a public employer may require mandatory alcohol and drug testing of employees without
a search warrant or showing of probable cause in jobs directly related to mass public
transportation, but must have a reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol abuse); Shoemaker
v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986) (administrative search exception applied to employees
of heavily regulated horse racing industry for the power of the State Racing Steward to
mandate drug and alcohol testing of employees), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986); American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (mandatory
periodic drug testing of civilian police officers holding critical jobs by the Defense Department
was an unreasonable search and seizure).
30. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-37 (1983) (to encourage the use of the warrant
procedure the magistrate must find a substantial basis that a search would uncover evidence
of wrongdoing).
31. See People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 293, 578 P.2d 123, 127, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880
(1978). When a warrant authorizing a bodily intrusion is sought, the court must, after finding
probable cause that the intrusion will reveal evidence of a crime, balance the necessity and
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an individual's fourth amendment right against the state interest in
having the information before issuing a search warrant authorizing
a bloodtest to be performed on an accused.12
By requiring a judicial determination of whether to order the
testing of the accused's blood for AIDS, Proposition 96 attempts to
obviate the need to obtain a search warrant.33 Nevertheless, there are
several obstacles the Proposition must overcome. First, Proposition
96 does not make the transfer of a bodily fluid while interfering
with the duties of peace officers, firefighters, or emergency medical
personnel a separate crime or aggravation of a crime. 4 Second,
Proposition 96 does not require the state to show probable cause
that the accused has AIDS, had AIDS or an AIDS-related condition
at the time of the interference or fluid transfer, or that the fluid
transferred is capable of transmitting the AIDS virus." Moreover,

reliability of the method of intrusion, the seriousness of the underlying criminal offense, the
strength of law enforcement suspicions that important evidence will be found, and the possibility
of recovery by less intrusive means against the severity of the intrusion. Id. A greater showing
of necessity by society is required as the intensity, length, more unsafe, or unusual the intrusion
to the individual becomes. Id.
32. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d at 293, 578 P.2d at 127, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (after a finding of
probable cause, the court must balance the accused's right to privacy against society's interest
in having the information). See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758-763 (1985) (also applying
the "probable cause plus" balancing test to surgical removal of a bullet when the health of
the accused was endangered); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766-72 (requiring an inquiry into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the warrantless and involuntary blood testing of a suspected
drunken driver, and weighing the individual's interests in privacy against society's interests in
performing the procedure).
33. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.96, 199.97 (providing judicial finding that
probable cause exists to believe that blood, saliva, semen, or other bodily fluid has been
transferred from the accused to the victim). But see Scott, 21 Cal. 3d at 293, 578 P.2d at
127, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (strong showings of need must be shown for bodily penetrations
with or vithout a warrant). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 1525 (issuance, probable cause,
supporting affidavits, contents of application for search warrants).
34. The Proposition only requires a showing of probable cause that a possible transfer
of a body fluid was transferred. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.96, 199.97. See Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 769-770 (searches of the body must be based on clear indications that desired
evidence of a crime will be found). See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)
(the Eighth Amendment forbids criminal punishment for the status of being ill and invalidated
a statute deeming addiction to narcotics a crime). See generally Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d
209, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1988) (reviewing mandatory AIDS testing, reliability of tests, and
findings in the context of child custody).
35. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988) (HIV is
transmitted by intimate sexual contact with an infected person, invasive exposure to contaminated blood or certain other body fluids, or perinatal exposure); Sullivan & Field, AIDS and
the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 158 (1988) (biting and
spitting have not been proven to be able to transmit the AIDS virus); Comment, Protecting
Children with AIDS Against Arbitrary Exclusion from School, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1373 (1986)
(there is a broad consensus that AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact). See also
Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213, 236-237 (1983) (the probable cause requirement means a
substantial basis that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing); Jarrett v. Faulkner,
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because transmission of AIDS is not itself a crime, the courts may

determine that the blood test constitutes an unreasonable government

36
intrusion. Due to the questionable accuracy of AIDS tests and the

manner in which the AIDS virus can be transmitted, 37 the state
interest in performing the blood test may not be found to be sufficient

in his
to impair the accused's fourth amendment right to be secure
3
1
intrusions.
governmental
unreasonable
person from such
In determining whether Proposition 96 violates the California or

federal constitutions, the courts must, where reasonable, construe the
39
language of the proposition to be constitutional. Proposition 96 is

often vague and seemingly ambiguous, and therefore may provide

4
the court some flexibility in interpretation. 0 For example, the language of the proposition requiring "medically approved" testing and
taking of two blood samples could be interpreted as necessitating
confirmatory tests. 41 Further, the statute is silent as to who is to

662 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (an action brought by inmates to order the Department of
Corrections to screen all inmates for AIDS and to segregate all homosexual prisoners was
dismissed for the failure to show that the risk of contracting AIDS was great enough to
plaintiffs to implicate their constitutional rights and therefore necessitate the testing and
segregation). But see Powell v. Department of Corrections, 647 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Okla.
1986) (suit brought by inmate diagnosed as having AIDS challenging his segregation from the
general population dismissed because of the legitimate purpose to prevent the spread of the
deadly disease and to protect the plaintiff from assault by other prisoners).
36. See Banks & McFadden, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing the reliability of present
testing methods and the high false-positive rate to protect the blood supply). See also Clifford
& luculano, supra note 26, at 1812 (a series of tests called the ELISA-ELISA-Western blot
has been found to have 99.9% accuracy); Merritt, supra note 26, at 746-747 (AIDS blood
tests only indicate that the person carries the antibodies to the AIDS virus, the tests do not
directly reveal the presence of the AIDS virus, and therefore, the presence of HIV antibodies
should only be considered presumptive evidence of current infection or infectiousness). See
-, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (1988) (accuracy rates
generally Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209,
of commercial laboratories vary widely and some have up to 20%o false-positive rates on
pretested samples).
37. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.46(h) (the AIDS virus is transmitted primarily
through sexual contact, sharing of hypodermic needles, contaminated blood transfusions, and
during pregnancy to the fetus).
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758-63 (1985) (a compelling need must be shown for the bodily intrusion
where the health of the person may be endangered); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 ("The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State"); Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209,
526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (1988) (a compelling state need must be shown for a mandatory AIDS
test when mental health is endangered). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (a defendant in a
criminal action is innocent until proven otherwise).
39. People v. Davis, 68 Cal.2d 481, 483, 439 P.2d 651, 652, 67 Cal. Rptr. 547, 548 (1968)
(setting forth premises of statutory construction).
40. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguities and comparing
other AIDS testing statutes).
41. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.98(b) (requiring medically accepted tests),
199.96 (requiring two samples of blood to be taken), 199.97 (requiring two samples of blood
to be taken).
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decide which tests are to be administered and who is to make the
disclosures of the results; 42 therefore, a court interpreting this language may conclude that the court which orders the test has the
responsibility of safeguarding the tested party's rights. 4 The ordering
court would then be required to determine at the petition hearing
whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the test is justified.
That court would then be required to determine what type of test is
to be administered and to whom the necessary disclosures are to be
made. This active role of the court would ensure some safeguarding
of the tested party's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights.
In summary, without proper safeguards, Proposition 96 may violate
the California and federal constitutions. The courts will have to
weigh a defendant's rights against the state interest in obtaining
nonconsensual information on AIDS. The state interest in containing
the AIDS virus must necessitate such testing and disclosure procedures. In addition, a court applying the rules of statutory construction
may interpret the vagueness in the statute as permitting an active
role by a court, thus ensuring a minimally intrusive procedure. Under
such an interpretation, Proposition 96 may provide the proper safeguards. The proportion of the spread of the AIDS virus and the
public uproar for measures to contain the deadly disease may warrant
such an intrusion of an individual's rights.
ESMI

42. See id. §§ 199.96 (requiring two specimens to be provided for testing), 199.97 (requiring
two specimens to be provided for testing), 199.98(b) (requiring medically approved tests to be
conducted on the blood specimens), 199.98(c) (requiring copies of positive test results to be
sent to the State Department of Health Services), 199.98(d) (requiring copies of the test resultG
to be sent to a minor's parents or guardian), 199.98(e) (allowing disclosures necessary for
medical or psychological care or advice). Proposition 96 is more specific about the disclosure
process in the custodial safety section. See also §§ 199.99(a) (allowing custodial personnel to
disclose information about an inmates exposure to AIDS to the officer in charge of the
facility), 199.99(c) (allowing the officer in charge of the facility to disclose to custodial
personnel information about an inmates exposure), 199.99(d) (allowing disclosures necessary
for m.-dical or psychological care or advice), 199.99(e) (providing a misdemeanor sanction for
willful disclosures of personal identifying information to any person who is not a peace officer
or an employee of a federal, state, or local health agency except as authorized by a court
order with the patient's consent).
43. See Kash Enterprises v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 305, 562 P.2d 1302,
1309, 138 Cal. Rptr. 53, 60 (1977) (legislation should be construed to preserve its constitutionality when reasonably possible).
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